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Off-Label Promotion After United States v. Caronia
Brian M Blood*
Perhaps you've spotted them at your primary care physician's
office during your annual physical, or maybe you've simply heard
anecdotes about them taking prescribers out to lavish meals. Maybe
you've simply wondered where the stationary, pens, or other supplies
bearing drug names at your physician's office come from. Whatever your
experience or opinion might be, you're likely aware that drug and
medical device manufacturers employ sales representatives to promote
their products directly to physicians and other prescribers.' Despite a
common preconception regarding the representative-prescriber
relationship-that representatives utilize gifts and meals to unduly
influence the prescriber into prescribing more of their company's
products 2-the profession is highly regulated and representatives play an
important role in patient treatment.3 Sales generated through
representatives' promotional activities ensure the profitability of a
product, help to offset the manufacturer's drug or device approval costs,
and allow for continued research and development efforts.4 Further,
representatives ensure that pertinent information regarding a certain
product reaches prescribers, increasing the relevant information at the
prescriber's disposal and allowing for informed treatment decisions.'
Manufacturers face a lengthy and costly process in getting new
prescription drugs and devices approved by the Food and Drug
* Juris Doctor Candidate, University of North Carolina School of Law, 2015;
Staff Member, FirstAmendment Law Review.
1. See, e.g., Pauline W. Chen, For Med Students, Love from the Drug Rep,
N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 3, 2013, 3:24 PM), http://well.blogs.nytimes.com/2013/10/03/formed-students-love-from-the-drug-rep/?r- 1.
2. See, e.g., Arlene Weintraub, Online Extra: Cracking Down on Pharma
Swag, BLOOMBERG BUSINESSWEEK (Oct. 22, 2006), http://www.businessweek
.com/stories/2006-10-22/online-extra-cracking-down-on-pharma-swag.
3. See Fazal Khan & Justin Holloway, Verify, Then Trust: How to Legalize
Off-Label Drug Marketing, 117 PENN. ST. L. REv. 407, 426 (2012).
4. Id.
5. Id.
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Administration (FDA)-FDA approval can take as long as twelve years
6
and cost more than $500 million. Given the steep costs of getting a new
drug to the market, manufacturers rarely seek approval for multiple or
secondary treatment indications for a given product,7 despite any
evidence of the secondary indication's efficacy. 8 Because of this
deterrent to seeking secondary approval for a product, manufacturers
largely rely on prescribers to prescribe a product for off-label uses that
have not been specifically approved by the FDA and do not contain
instructions for use on the product's packaging or label.9 An estimated
twenty-one percent of prescriptions nationwide are for off-label uses,to
6. Martin S. Lipsky & Lisa K. Sharpe, From Idea to Market: The Drug
Approval Process, 14 J. AM. BOARD FAM. MED. 362, 364 (2001).
7. An indication is a "description of [the] use of [the] drug in the treatment
prevention or diagnosis of a recognized disease or condition." FDA DRUG
DEVELOPMENT AND REVIEW DEFINITIONS, available at http://www.fda.gov/
drugs/developmentapprovalprocess/howdrugsaredevelopedandapproved/approvalapp
lications/investigationalnewdrugindapplication/ucm 176522.htm.
8. Rebecca Dresser & Joel Frader, Off-Label Prescribing: A Call for
Heightened Professional and Government Oversight, 37 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 476,
476 (2009). While secondary approval would allow a manufacturer to engage in the
full range of promotional activities related to a product's additional use,
manufacturers do not seek secondary approval for a number of reasons. Id. at 478.
The secondary approval process, while not as costly or time-consuming as the initial
process, still requires that, among other things, a manufacturer submit to the FDA
additional data demonstrating the product's effectiveness for the new use. See 21
C.F.R. § 314.70 (2008). In light of the costs associated with acquiring and
submitting this new data, manufacturers might determine that the patient population
for the secondary use is sufficiently small to deter secondary approval, or that profits
from off-label prescribing are sufficiently high without seeking secondary approval.
See Dresser & Frader at 476.
9. See Randall S. Stafford, Regulating Off-Label Drug Use - Rethinking the
Role of the FDA, 358 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1427, 1427 (2008). Note that instructions or
information regarding a product's off-label indications are not included in the
product's labeling and packaging. Common examples of products used off-label
include the drugs, by trade name, Elavil, approved for depression but also prescribed
to prevent migraines, Topamax, approved for epilepsy but also prescribed for
alcohol addiction, and Zyprexa, approved for schizophrenia and bipolar disorder but
also prescribed for dementia. Luciana Gravotta, Why Doctors Prescribe Off-Label
Drugs, SCIENTIFIC AMERICAN (Apr. 11, 2013), http://www.scientificamerican.com
/article.cfm?id=why-doctors-prescribe-off-label-drugs.
10. David C. Radley, Stan N. Finkelstein & Randall S. Stafford, Off-Label
PrescribingAmong Office-Based Physicians, 166 ARCHIVES INTERNAL MED. 1021,
1021 (2006); see also Darshak Sanghavi, Cooking the Books: The Statistical Games
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indicating that a significant portion of a manufacturer's revenues on
product sales are through off-label prescribing. " Further, for diseases
affecting a very small portion of the population, the costs associated with
FDA approval likely outweigh the possible revenue for the manufacturer,
making off-label prescribing the patient's only treatment option.12
Physicians are free to prescribe products to patients for reasons
the physicians find medically appropriate, regardless of whether the
indication is FDA-approved and listed on the manufacturer's product
packaging and label.' 3 At the same time representatives, who conduct
what is referred to broadly as "detailing," 4 are paid commissions based
on the volume of specific drugs prescribed within their sales region; thus,
they have an incentive to promote a drug for all indications.'5 However,
representatives are prohibited from marketing products for off-label
Behind "Off-Label" Prescription Drug Use, SLATE (Dec. 21, 2009, 12:28 PM),
http://www.slate.com/articles/news-and_politics/prescriptions/2009/12/cookingthe
books.html.
11. See, e.g., David Evans, Pfizer Broke the Law by Promoting Drugs for
Unapproved
Uses,
BLOOMBERG
(Nov.
9,
2009,
12:01
AM),
http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=newsarchive&sid=a4yVlnYxCGoA
(indicating that Pfizer, which was fined for its off-label promotion of the drug
Neurontin, made approximately $2.12 billion in 2002 alone on off-label
prescriptions of the drug). See also Radley et al., supra note 10, at 1021. It should
also be noted that three-quarters of marketed prescription drugs have no labeling
indications for children; thus, prescribing to a child will likely be considered offlabel. Tracy Hampton, Experts Weigh in on Promotion, Prescription of Off-Label
Drugs, 297 J. AM. MED. Ass'N 683 (Feb. 21, 2007), http://jama.jamanetwork
.com/article.aspx?articleid=205641.
12. Gregory Gentry, CriminalizingKnowledge: The Perverse Implications of
the Intended Use Regulationsfor Off-Label Promotion Prosecutions, 64 FOOD &
DRUG L.J. 441, 442 (2009).
13. See Dresser & Frader, supra note 8, at 476.
14. Sorrell v. IMS Health, Inc.,
U.S.
, 131 S. Ct. 2653, 2659 (2011).
15. See, e.g., Shaefer-LaRose v. Eli Lilly & Co., 663 F. Supp. 2d 674, 681
(S.D. Ind. 2009) (explaining that in addition to a fixed salary, representatives at
defendant manufacturer were entitled to bonus compensation based in part on
physician prescriptions). See also John Osborn, GlaxoSmithKline May Be Motivated
By Scandal, But Changing Compensation Schemes for Docs and Sales Reps is the
Right Move, FORBES (Dec. 23, 2013, 9:44 PM), http://www.forbes.com/sites
/johnosbom/2013/12/23/glaxosmithkline-may-be-motivated-by-scandal-butchanging-compensation-schemes-for-docs-and-sales-reps-is-the-right-move/2/
(noting one manufacturer's shift from representative compensation tied to
prescription volume).
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indications, even if the marketing in question is a simple discussion with
a prescriber about the non-fraudulent or truthful off-label use of a
product.16 This prohibition comes in the form of government
prosecutions against both the representative and the manufacturer for offlabel promotion under either the Food and Drug Cosmetic Act's
(FDCA)17 misbranding provisions or the Federal False Claims Act
(FCA). This Note focuses on the FDCA provisions.
The FDCA contains no express prohibition on off-label
marketing by manufacturers and their representatives, but the
government has interpreted the statute as prohibiting the activity. 19 The
consequences of off-label promotion-both fraudulent and truthful-can
be detrimental for manufacturers. From 2004 to 2010, the government
settled twenty-one cases involving off-label marketing, with over half of
these settlements amounting to more than $100 million each.20 In 2009,
for example, Pfizer paid a fine of $2.3 billion to the FDA for the off-label
promotion of their drug Bextra.21 In addition, more than seventy percent
of these cases have ended in criminal pleas.22
In Sorrell v. IMS Health, Inc.,23 decided in June 2011, the

Supreme Court of the United States addressed the practice of data
mining, a subset of manufacturer detailing whereby pharmaceutical
companies use data related to a particular physician's prescribing

16. See 21 U.S.C. § 331(a), (b), (d) (2012) (prohibiting the misbranding of
drugs and devices, which has been interpreted to include promoting such products
off-label).
17. 21 U.S.C. §§ 301-399 (2012).
18. 31 U.S.C. § 3729 (2012). See Khan & Holloway, supra note 3, at 410.
Note that the FCA comes into play where government programs such as Medicare or
Medicaid are billed for the allegedly fraudulent activity. 31 U.S.C. § 3729(a)(1)(A)
(imposing liability on any person who presents or causes to present a false or
fraudulent claim for payment or approval to one of the federal programs).
19. See 21 U.S.C. § 352 (2012).
20. Antonia F. Giuliana, Statistics for Off-Label Marketing Settlements
Involving Prescription Drugs, KELLEY DRYE & WARREN LLP (Mar. 2, 2011),
available at http://www.lexology.com/library/detail.aspx?g-df7747e8-dd57-454da29d-3f59baed69c4.
21. Gardiner Harris, Pfizer Pays $2.3 Billion to Settle Marketing Case, N.Y.
TIMES (Sept. 3, 2009), at B4.
22. See Giuliana,supra note 20.
23.
U.S.
, 131 S. Ct. 2653 (2011).
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practices24 to target marketing efforts at specific populations or
25
individuals.
The Court found that a Vermont law prohibiting
pharmacies from selling data related to prescription patterns created both
26
speaker- and content-based speech restrictions, and that, despite
substantial government justification for the law, it was unconstitutionally
27
restrictive of the company's right to free speech.
Then, in December 2012, the Second Circuit Court of Appeals
decided United States v. Caronia.28 The defendant in Caronia was a
representative who was recorded telling a doctor that a medication
approved for a narrow set of conditions could also be used to treat other
29
conditions. The representative was prosecuted for violating the FDCA's
misbranding provisions.30 In its decision, the Second Circuit determined
that prosecuting representatives' truthful off-label speech under the
FDCA violated the First Amendment. 31 The Second Circuit held (1) that
the government had prosecuted Caronia for his content- and speakerbased speech, (2) that the FDCA misbranding provisions and the
government's interpretation of the provisions were subject to heightened
scrutiny, and (3) that truthful and non-fraudulent off-label drug
promotion was speech protected by the First Amendment under both
Sorrell3 2 and the four-prong test established by Central Hudson Gas &
Electric Corp. v. Public Service Commission ofNew York. 3 The Caronia
decision prompted a wave of analysis, commentary, and prognostication
for the future of off-label marketing. 3 4
24. The data at issue in Sorrell was "prescriber-identifying information" that
pharmacies receive when processing prescriptions. Id. at 2659-2660.
25. See id at 2659.
26. See id. at 2662-65.
27. Id. at 2672.
28. 703 F.3d 149 (2d Cir. 2012).
29. Id. at 156.
30. Id. at 157.
31. Id. at 164.
32.
U.S. _, 131 S.Ct. 2653 (2011).
33. Caronia,703 F.3d at 164.
34. See, e.g., Jared Iraggi, The Future of Off-Label Marketing Regulation in
the Post-SorrellEra, 43 SETON HALL L. REV. 1137 (2013); Sara A. Poulos & Mitha
V. Rao, What's Left for Plaintiffs in Off-Label PharmaceuticalPromotion Cases
After United States v. Caronia?, 60 FED. LAW 42 (May 2013); Recent Cases, First
Amendment-Commercial Speech-Second Circuit Holds That ProhibitingTruthful
Off-Label Promotion of FDA-Approved Drugs by PharmaceuticalRepresentatives
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This Note proceeds in three Parts. Part I establishes the
background of off-label regulation and interpretation, focusing on the
FDCA provisions, government guidance, and the recent Supreme Court
case Sorrell v. IMS Health, Inc.35 Part II details the 2012 Second Circuit
case United States v. Caronia.36 Finally, Part III discusses the
implications for the parties involved in the representative-prescriber
relationship if the Caroniaholding were to be applied beyond the Second
Circuit, as is suggested by the Supreme Court's holding in Sorrell.37
Most notably, Part III.C discusses the implications of these holdings for
the government and analyzes the alternatives to the current off-label
regime suggested by the Caroniacourt.38
I. FDA REGULATIONS AND SORRELL v. IMS HEALTH, INC. 39
The process of bringing a new drug or medical device into the
market is both time-consuming and costly.4o A manufacturer must follow
a strict process enacted by the FDA, including, but not limited to,
conducting manufacturer-funded clinical trials for efficacy and safety for
each intended use of the drug. 4 1 The FDA approves drugs for a narrow
set of conditions, not for universal use, and off-label marketing occurs
when a manufacturer endorses a drug for uses that have not been

Violates the First Amendment-United States v. Caronia, 703 F.3d 149 (2d Cir.
2012), 127 HARV. L. REV. 795 (2013); Michael J. Scheineson & Guillermo Cuevas,
United States v. Caronia, The IncreasingStrength of Commercial Free Speech and
Potential New Emphasis on Classifying Off-Label Promotion as "False and
Misleading," 68 FOOD & DRUG L.J. 201 (2013); Han Helen Yan, Off-Label
Promotion Is Protected Speech: Second Circuit Sweeps Away Pharmaceutical
Representative's Misbranding Conviction Under the First Amendment - United
States v. Caronia, 39 AM. J.L. & MED. 189 (2013).
35. See infra Part 1.
36. 703 F.3d 149 (2012). See infra Part II.
37. _ U.S. _, 131 S. Ct. 2653 (2011). See infra Part III.
38. See infra Part III.C.
39.

_

U.S.

, 131 S. Ct. 2653 (2011).

40. See, e.g., Matthew Herper, The Cost of Creating a New Drug Now $5
Billion, Pushing Big Pharma to Change, FORBES (Aug. 11, 2013, 11:10 AM),
http://www.forbes.com/sites/matthewherper/2013/08/1 1/how-the-staggering-cost-ofinventing-new-drugs-is-shaping-the-future-of-medicine/.
41. See Stafford, supra note 9, at 1427.
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42

approved by the FDA. Prescribers, however, can lawfully prescribe a
drug for any indication that they feel is medically necessary, regardless
of the scope of FDA approval and despite the strict regulations
43
applicable to manufacturers.
The FDCA and its accompanying regulations set forth the
requirements
governing the manufacture
and branding of
pharmaceuticals, medical devices, and biological products.44
Specifically, the FDCA provides that a product's labeling may only
contain information on the product's FDA-approved uses, and defines
labeling narrowly to include the tangible materials that accompany a
drug, such as packaging and product labels.45 The FDA, however,
defines labeling as any materials or information that a manufacturer or its
employees-including sales representatives-might produce, including
their speech, regardless of whether the information accompanies the drug

itself.46
It is the FDA's broad interpretation of labeling that the Justice
Department utilizes in enforcing the FDCA's misbranding provision,
allowing the government to punish manufacturers that make assertions
47
inconsistent with a product's labeling. Thus, any statement about a
product made by a manufacturer or representative is considered to be
about the drug's "intended use," and the statement may only reference
48
the FDA-approved uses of the product. Otherwise, the statement will
qualify as misbranding or mislabeling, and the FDCA criminalizes the
distribution or introduction of misbranded drugs into the stream of
commerce. 4 9 This expansive definition of labeling in the application of
the FDCA's misbranding provisions thus permits physicians to prescribe
a product for any indication they feel is medically necessary while

42. Id.
43. Id.
44. 21 U.S.C. §§ 351-360 (2012).
45. See 21 U.S.C.

§ 321(m).

46. See 21 U.S.C. §§ 321(p), 355(a), (b), (j).
47. See 21 U.S.C. §§ 321(p), 352(a), 355(a), (b), (j); see also 21 C.F.R. §
201.1-201.58 (2009).
48. See John E. Osborn, Can I Tell You the Truth? A Comparative Perspective
on Regulating Off-Label Scientific and Medical Information, 10 YALE J. HEALTH
POL'Y L. & ETHICS 299, 309-10 (2010).
49. See 21 U.S.C. § 352.
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restricting manufacturers and representatives in promoting a product,
regardless of the assertions' truthfulness.50
The FDA has, however, established certain exceptions that allow
manufacturers to promote a product for off-label uses. Prescriber
knowledge of a product's effective off-label use is the only means by
which a drug will be prescribed off-label. As such, manufacturers may, at
the request of the prescriber, distribute the results of peer-reviewed
52
studies appearing in publications with an expert editorial board. Several
conditions attach, namely that the studies (1) should not be influenced by
the manufacturer in any way and (2) must be distributed under strict
FDA guidelines.53 The FDA also encourages manufacturers to seek
amended secondary approval for additional "intended uses," which
requires the manufacturer to reenter the FDA-approval process, though
the secondary approval process is then less intensive. 54
As previously mentioned, the Supreme Court addressed the
protection of commercial speech as it relates to a manufacturer's ability
to solicit physician prescribing information and a pharmacy's ability to
profit from prescription information in Sorrell v. IMS Health, Inc.

5

The

Sorrell Court found a 2007 Vermont law prohibiting such practices to be
56
In doing so, the Court held that both the
unconstitutional.

50. See Iraggi,supra note 34, at 1144.
51. See, e.g., Stafford, supra note 9, at 1427-28.
52. The editorial board of the publishing organization must use "experts who
have demonstrated expertise in the subject of the article under review by the
organization . . . who are independent of the organization to review and objectively
select, reject, or provide comments about proposed articles," and the publication
must have a publicly-stated conflict of interest policy requiring disclosure of any
conflicts or biases among authors, contributors, or editors. U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH
AND HUMAN SERVICES, GUIDANCE FOR INDUSTRY: GOOD REPRINT PRACTICES FOR
DISTRIBUTION OF MEDICAL JOURNAL ARTICLES AND MEDICAL OR SCIENTIFIC
REFERENCE PUBLICATIONS ON UNAPPROVED NEW USES OF APPROVED DRUGS AND
(Jan. 2009),
available at
APPROVED OR CLEARED MEDICAL DEVICES
http://www.fda.gov/OHRMS/DOCKETS/98fr/FDA-2008-D-0053-gdl.pdf
[hereinafter GUIDANCE FOR INDUSTRY].

53. See id.
54. Id.
55.

_

U.S.

, 131 S.Ct. 2653, 2664-67 (2011).

56. Id. at 2659.
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manufacturer's right to market to physicians and the pharmacy's right to
sell prescription information are protected by the First Amendment.57
The Sorrell Court used a two-step inquiry: first considering
whether the speech-restricting regulation was content-based, forbidding
particular content of the speech (i.e. marketing), and speaker-based,
restricting the speech of a particular speaker (i.e. detailers),5 and then
considering whether the government had adequately shown that the
restrictions survived the applicable level of scrutiny.5 9
The Court found that because the Vermont statute set forth both
content-based restrictions on the marketing of prescriber information and
speaker-based restrictions on manufacturers, the statute was subject to
* 60
heightened scrutiny.
The Court held that speech in aid of
pharmaceutical marketing is a form of expression protected by the First
61
Amendment, thus in the face of heightened scrutiny the Vermont
regulation was presumptively invalid.62 Recognizing that the State was
required to show "at least that the statute directly advance[d] a
substantial governmental interest and that the measure [was] drawn to
achieve that interest" without disproportionately burdening the speech,63
the Court noted Vermont's stated interests of protecting medical privacy
and achieving policy goals geared towards improved healthcare at lower
costs.6
In the second step of the Sorrell analysis, the Court applied the
test espoused in CentralHudson Gas & Electric Corp. v. Public Service
Commission of New York, determining that the Vermont statute failed
66
even under the lesser standard of intermediate scrutiny. CentralHudson
applied a four-part test and an intermediate level of scrutiny to determine

57. Id.
58. Id. at 2656-57.
59. Id. at 2663.
60. Id. at 2663-67.

61. Id. at 2667-68.
62. Id.
63. Id.
64. Id. at 2668.

65. 447 U.S. 557 (1980).
66. Sorrell, _ U.S. at _, 131 S. Ct. at 2667-68. In other words, the Sorrell
Court, by adhering to the Central Hudson test, inserted a four-step test into its
second prong instead of proposing a new five-step test encompassing all factors.
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the constitutionality of a regulation restricting commercial speech.67 The
first prong requires that the speech not be misleading and concern lawful
activity.68 If the speech does not meet this requirement, it is afforded no
First Amendment protection and can be reasonably regulated. 69 The
second and third prongs of the Central Hudson test require that the
asserted government interest be substantial, and that the regulation
directly and materially advance the asserted government interest. 7 0
Finally, the fourth prong requires that the regulation be narrowly drawn
and not be more extensive than necessary to serve the asserted
government interest.7 ' The Sorrell Court decided that, even without
applying the CentralHudson test, the Vermont law was both a contentand speaker-based regulation on its face, thereby triggering heightened
scrutiny.72 Determining that the law did not meet the heightened scrutiny,
the Court held that "[s]peech in aid of pharmaceutical marketing . . . is a

form of expression protected by the ... First Amendment." 73 Further, in
suggesting less restrictive alternatives and indicating that Vermont
allowed for the information to be disseminated to all but a limited class
of speakers, the Court determined that the statute was not narrowly
tailored enough to the state's interest to satisfy the heightened scrutiny. 74
The precedent established in Sorrell, whereby the Court utilized
a two-step analysis encompassing the Central Hudson test to determine
the validity of a law prohibiting manufacturer and representative speech,
75
was recently applied by the Second Circuit in United States v. Caronia.
Caronia directly addresses the FDCA's misbranding provisions
following the conviction of a representative for truthful off-label
76
promotion.

67.
68.
69.
70.
71.
72.
73.
74.
75.
76.

CentralHudson, 447 U.S. at 563-64.
Id. at 566.
Id.
Id.
Id.
See Iraggi, supra note 34, at 1148.
U.S. _,
Sorrell v. IMS Health, Inc.,
Id. at 2668-69.
703 F.3d 149, 164 (2012).
Id. at 157-58.

131 S. Ct. 2653, 2659 (2011).
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II. UNITED STATES V. CARONIA
Alfred Caronia was a Specialty Sales Consultant employed by
Orphan Medical, Inc.77 to promote Xyrem, a drug approved to treat
78
narcoleptic patients with cataplexy and excessive daytime sleepiness.
As required by the FDA, Xyrem has a "black box" warning, the most
serious kind of warning required by the FDA to be placed on a product's
labeling and packaging.79 In a recorded conversation between Caronia
and a prescriber, Caronia promoted Xyrem for off-label uses.so Caronia
was subsequently convicted of conspiracy to introduce a misbranded
drug into interstate commerce in violation of the FDCA's misbranding
provisions, 18 U.S.C. § 371(a) and 21 U.S.C. § 331(a). On appeal,
Caronia argued that his conviction should be overturned because he had
been truthfully promoting the drug and had not misrepresented the safety
or efficacy of Xyrem.82 The government contended that Caronia's
conviction did not implicate the First Amendment because he had not
been punished for engaging in protected speech; rather, his statements
had merely evinced the intent necessary to establish misbranding for a
non-approved drug use.
In a 2-1 decision, the Second Circuit rejected the government's
assertion that the First Amendment did not apply, holding that the FDA
and the government had improperly prosecuted Caronia for his off-label
marketing of Xyrem.84 Applying the Sorrell analysis, the court held that
the First Amendment applied to the statements at issue because the
FDCA provisions restrict both content- and speaker-based speech.
Under the second prong of the Sorrell analysis, the court applied the
Central Hudson test to determine whether the restrictions imposed on
77. Orphan Medical was acquired by Jazz Pharmaceuticals in 2005. See
Orphan
Medical,
Inc.
Company
Profile,
YAHOO!
FINANCE,
http://biz.yahoo.com/ic/46/46606.html (last visited Jan. 12, 2014).
78. See Caronia, 703 F.3d at 155 (explaining that the active ingredient in
Xyrem is gamma-hydroxybutryate, also known as the "date rape drug").
79. Id.
80. Id. at 158, n.6.
81. Id. at 159; see also 18 U.S.C. § 371(a) (2012); 21 U.S.C. § 331(a) (2012).
82. Caronia,703 F.3d at 160.
83. Id. at 160-61.
84. Id. at 152.
85. Id. at 164.
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Caronia by the government's interpretation of the FDCA could withstand
heightened scrutiny.86 The Second Circuit determined that the first two
elements of the Central Hudson test were easily met. As to the first
element, the court found that because physicians and other prescribers
may lawfully prescribe drugs for off-label indications, the speech at issue
concerned lawful activity. For the second element, the court determined
that the government and the FDA had a substantial interest in
"preserving the efficacy and integrity of the FDA's drug approval
process and reducing patient exposure to unsafe and ineffective drugs."89
The court found, however, that the government could not satisfy
the third and fourth prongs of the CentralHudson test.90 Under the third
prong, the court stated that off-label prescribing and usage is not
unlawful and that the FDA's product approval process contemplates that
approved drugs will be used for off-label purposes.9 1 Noting the
92
government's substantial interests, the court nonetheless found that
prohibiting truthful promotion of off-label use of a product by a certain
class of speakers while allowing off-label prescribing by practitioners
would not directly further the government's goals.93 Further, the court
stated that the third prong failed because the law "'paternalistically'
interferes with the ability of physicians and patients to receive potentially
relevant treatment information" 94 by legalizing the outcome but
prohibiting "the free flow of information that would inform that
outcome." 95
The Caronia court then determined that the government's
interpretation of the FDCA, which imposes a "complete and criminal ban
on off-label promotion by pharmaceutical manufacturers," fails the
fourth prong of the Central Hudson test by being "more extensive than
86. Id at 164-67. The court here, like in Sorrell, does not indicate exactly
which level of scrutiny they are applying, but the Central Hudson test seems to be
less onerous than strict scrutiny.
87. Id. at 165-66.
88. Id
89. Id. at 166.
90. Id. at 166-68.
91. Id. at 166.
92. Id at 166-67.
93. Id. at 166.
94. Id.
95. Id. at 167.
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necessary to achieve the government's substantial interests."9 6 The court
stated, "[W]e decline to adopt the government's construction of the
FDCA's misbranding provisions to prohibit manufacturer promotion
alone as it would unconstitutionally restrict free speech." 97 Thus, in
applying Sorrell and Central Hudson, the Caronia court found that offlabel speech is protected by the First Amendment and that the
government's enforcement of off-label promotion under the FDCA
98
unconstitutionally restricts a manufacturer's free speech.
In holding that the government's interpretation of the FDCA offlabel provisions fails the fourth step of the Central Hudson analysis, the
court listed several "narrowly drawn" alternatives that it claimed would
advance the integrity of the FDA's drug approval process without
creating excessive First Amendment restrictions." The court suggested
that the government should more directly address the issue if it is
concerned about the use of approved products for off-label purposes.'oo
Moreover, if the government has concerns with marketers misleading
patients via off-label promotion, the court suggested "guid[ing]
physicians and patients in differentiating between misleading and false
promotion, exaggerations and embellishments, and truthful or non10 1
misleading information."
The court next posited that the government could develop a
warning or disclaimer system, or "safety tiers within the off-label
market," to distinguish drugs requiring extra caution.' 0 2 Alternatively, the
court suggested, "the government could require manufacturers to list all
applicable or intended indications" of a product when applying for FDA
approval, enabling physicians, the government, and patients to track a
drug's development.10 3 Further, the court stated that in order to minimize
off-label use or prevent evasion of the FDA approval process, the
government could (1) create ceilings or caps on off-label prescriptions of
a product, (2) remind the parties involved of the legal liability for off96. Id.
97. Id. at 168.
98. Id.
99. Id. at 167-68.
100. Id. at 168.
101. Id.
102. Id.
103. Id.
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label promotion, or (3) prohibit off-label prescribing altogether for
particularly dangerous products. 104 Despite the government's argument
that alternatives to the current FDCA provisions would not be
administrable, feasible, or effective, the Caronia court determined that,
in the absence of convincing evidence to the contrary, alternatives to the
FDA's enforcement of non-fraudulent off-label speech would provide a
better fit than the current system.105
The dissenter in Caroniaargued that the majority undermined
the fundamental purpose of the FDCA, which is to ensure the safety and
efficacy of drugs through a rigorous premarket approval process.106 The
dissent posited that, should manufacturers be permitted to lawfully
market their products for off-label uses, their incentive to seek further
approval would be eliminated, and the FDA's ability to determine all
risks and benefits of a drug would be threatened.107 Further, the dissent
accused the majority of incorrectly framing the FDCA's restriction on
off-label promotion as a barrier to the ability of physicians to receive
potentially relevant treatment information, and argued that the court's
decision ran the risk of rendering the entirety of the FDCA
unconstitutional.108
III. MANUFACTURER, PHYSICIAN, AND GOVERNMENT IMPLICATIONS
The repercussions of the Caronia decision have yet to be felt,
and despite a wealth of scholarship on the decision since it was
rendered,' 09 it is unclear whether Caronia will be viewed as a turning
point in First Amendment jurisprudence related to off-label marketing or
as an outlier from the Second Circuit.1 0 There are certainly cogent
arguments, discussed by several commentators, that the FDA's
regulatory program should not be treated the same as other content- and
speaker-based restrictions due to off-label marketing's potential to pose

104. Id
105. Id at 168-69.

106. Id. at 177-78 (Livingston, J., dissenting).
107. Id. at 178.
108. Id. at 179.
109. See supra note 34.
110. See, e.g., Poulos & Rao, supranote 34, at 46.
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significant risks to patients." Despite these arguments, the government,
perhaps fearing that a loss at the Supreme Court would invalidate the
FDA's entire approval and enforcement systems, chose not to seek
certiorari. 1 I
The Caronia holding itself is limited in a number of ways, the
most obvious being that the case is binding only in the Second Circuit. 113
Manufacturers operating within that jurisdiction, however, which
encompasses Connecticut, New York, and Vermont, likely also distribute
products outside of those states, and thus can still be subject to the
FDA's current enforcement scheme.114 Further, the scope of Caronia is
narrow in that the decision only made a determination on the
constitutionality of prosecutions under the FDCA's misbranding
provisions and did not address enforcement of the FCA's off-label
marketing provisions." The speech protected by the ruling is also
limited to truthful speech for off-label promotion of products for which
off-label use is not prohibited,'l6 whereas the majority of recent
government settlements in off-label cases have alleged fraudulent or

111. See Recent Cases, supra note 34, at 799-800 (describing the adverse
regulatory and public health effects that applying a more demanding commercial
speech inquiry to prescription drug regulations would create); see also Ralph S.
Tyler et al., Anomalies and Implications: The First Amendment and "Off-Label"
Promotion, FOR THE DEFENSE, Oct. 2012, at 34, 38 (illustrating the unique
regulatory approach for off-label promotion, whereby the government willingly pays
for medically-appropriate off-label products via Medicare and Medicaid while the
Department of Justice punishes manufacturers for promoting those same products for
off-label use).
112. Government Will Not Appeal 2nd Circuit'sRuling in Caronia, 21 No. 12
FDA ENFORCEMENT MANUAL NEWSL. 1 (Jan. 28, 2013) available at
fda.complianceexpert.com/news/govemment-will-not-appeal-2nd-circuit-s-ruling-ini-caronia-i-l.32q560?qr-l.
113. See Caronia,703 F.3d at 149.
114. See Scheineson & Cuevas, supra note 34, at 214.
115. See Iraggi, supra note 34, at 1155-56 (pointing out that Caronia is
significant because it: (1) relied heavily on Sorell in the determination that the
FDCA provisions represented content- and speaker-based restrictions; (2)
disregarded a strict scrutiny standard, although available, and instead applied the less
strict Central Hudson test; and (3) that the scope was narrowed by not addressing
FCA claims).
116. There might be instances where the off-label use is contraindicated. See
Poulos & Rao, supra note 34, at 46.
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misleading statements.' 17 Despite these limitations, Caronia has been
cited in a number of state and federal court cases and briefs, both within
and outside of the Second Circuit's jurisdiction, as establishing
heightened scrutiny for content- and speaker-based restrictions related to
off-label drug promotion.'
The remainder of this Note assumes, for the sake of argument,
that the Caronia holding, which applies the Sorell and Central Hudson
tests to the FDA's enforcement of the FDCA's off-label drug and device
marketing restrictions, will be accepted by the Supreme Court. Under
this assumption, the repercussions of Caronia on manufacturers,
physicians, and the government can be more readily assessed and the
alternatives to the current FDA regime can be better analyzed. In the
following subsections, the impact of the Caronia holding will be
analyzed in relation to (1) manufacturers, (2) physicians and patients, and
(3) the government.
A. Manufacturers
Should the holding in Caronia-that off-label promotion by
representatives is constitutionally protectedl9-be adopted by the
Supreme Court and therefore apply nationwide, the result would be
viewed as a coup for drug and device manufacturers. The holding would,
in theory and in lieu of an alternative regulation scheme, free
manufacturers and their representatives from liability for truthful offlabel promotion and marketing. Therefore, many of the implications for
manufacturers in terms of compliance and mitigation efforts postCaronia would largely depend on the government's reaction and
117. Id. (listing several recent settlements from the likes of GlaxoSmithKline
and Pfizer alleging misleading fraudulent off-label marketing resulting in settlements
in the tens of millions of dollars or more).
118. See, e.g., Ramirez v. Medtronic Inc., No. CV-13-00512-PHX-GMS,
2013 WL 4446913 (D. Ariz. Aug. 21, 2013); Golub Corp. v. Tisch, No. 1:11 -CV1516 (LEK/CFH), 2013 WL 2285389 (N.D.N.Y. May 23, 2013); Lawrence v.
Medtronic, Inc., No. 27-CV-13-1197, 2013 Minn. Dist. LEXIS 3 (Minn. Dist. Ct.
Aug. 7, 2013); Brief for Appellant at 6, U.S. ex. rel. Polansky v. Pfizer, Inc., No. 125008-cv, 2013 WL 4374379 (2d Cir. Aug. 8, 2013); Brief for Respondent, Coleman
v. Medtronic Corp., No. B243609, 2013 WL 3778607 (Cal. App. 2d Dist. July 10,
2013).
119. United States v. Caronia, 703 F.3d 149, 149 (2d Cir. 2012).
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subsequent alternative approaches to asserting the government's
interests.
If truthful off-label marketing is constitutionally protected,
manufacturers might view the stated interest in Caronia (providing a
flow of information to physicians and patients)12 as encouragement for
promoting off-label indications in print advertisements, television
commercials, or other direct-to-consumer advertising.121 The result from
increased direct-to-consumer advertising would likely manifest in
patients requesting specific prescriptions from their physicians, and the
risk in such a scenario is that physicians might lack adequate information
about the products being requested.122 Direct-to-consumer advertising,
however, is independently and strictly regulated.123 Thus, without a
judicial attack on the specific regulatory and enforcement schemes of
direct-to-consumer advertising, the Caronia decision would have little
conceivable affect on a manufacturer or representative's ability to reach
consumers directly, and would only affect interactions between
representatives and prescribers.124
Caroniamight also change the landscape of the FDA approval
process for manufacturers. The dissent in Caronia argued (and some
commentators agree) that the impact of allowing manufacturers to make
potentially unlimited claims of a drug's non-approved indications would
125
be drastic and would create a disincentive for alternate FDA approval.
Under the current system, manufacturers are encouraged to have
products approved for secondary indications through the FDA's
supplemental NDA approval process, which requires a showing by the
manufacturer that the additional indications are supported by proof of the
indication's claims of benefit.126 If the FDA can no longer stop claims
120. Id. at 166.
121. See Khan & Holloway, supra note 3, at 438.
122. See Margaret Gilhooley, Commercial Speech, Drugs, Promotion and a
Tailored Advertisement Moratorium, 21 HEALTH MATRIX 97, 102-03 (2011)
(discussing the effect of a pharmaceutical advertisement on patients and physicians).
123. See, e.g., FDA Advertising Guidances, U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH & Hum.
SERVICES, http://www.fda.gov/Drugs/GuidanceComplianceRegulatorynformation
/Guidances/ucm064956.htm (last visited Jan. 12, 2014).
124. See id.
125. See Tyler et al., supra note 111, at 38.
126. See United States v. Caronia, 703 F.3d 149, 179 (2d Cir. 2012); Yan,
supra note 34, at 192.
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from being made without proof, misinformed treatment decisions might
result from reduced supplemental NDAs and an "unreliable set of
product benefit assertions."' 2 7 Thus, as the Caronia dissent argues,
manufacturers would lose any incentive to have their products approved
by the FDA through legitimate, though burdensome and cost-prohibitive,
means, instead relying on off-label promotion and marketing for
128
unapproved product uses.
Additionally, the Caroniadecision might drastically change the
FDA's ability to restrict non-oral communication regarding off-label use
of products.129 Currently, the FDA allows manufacturers to provide a
prescriber with available literature and scholarly articles regarding a
product's off-label use when the prescriber inquires as to the off-label
use of a certain product either to a representative or directly to the
manufacturer.1 30 The FDA's Good Reprint Practice Guidance13 1 indicates
that all written communication discussing off-label uses of a product
should note that the off-label uses described have not been FDA
approved.132 Further, the communication should (1) disclose any
manufacturer financial interests in the studies cited, (2) include all
significant risks and safety concems known to the manufacturer, (3) be
accompanied by approved product labeling, and (4) include a
comprehensive bibliography of contrary authority. 133 Following the
Caroniadecision, manufacturers might have less incentive to make these
documents available to prescribers since representatives could directly
communicate with the prescriber about truthful off-label indications. 134
127. JAMES T. O'REILLY, FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., FDA AND OFF-LABEL DRUG
PROMOTION - OFF-LABEL SELLING V. COMMERCIAL SPEECH, FOOD & DRUG ADMIN.

§ 15.48.50 (3d ed. 2013).
128. Caronia,703 F.3d at 179.
129. See generally Khan & Holloway, supra note 3, at 417-18 (describing the
current restrictions on non-oral communications between manufacturers and
prescribers).
130. GUIDANCE FOR INDUSTRY, supra note 52.
131. Id.
132. Id.
133. Id.
134. But see Edmund Polubinski III, Note, Closing the Channels of
Communication: A FirstAmendment Analysis of the FDA's Policy on Manufacturer
Promotion of "Off-Label" Use, 83 VA. L. REv. 991, 1025 (1997) (suggesting that
manufacturers be required to disclose certain conflicts of interest regarding
sponsored educational programs for prescribers).
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With less demand for scholarly, non-biased articles about a product's
off-label uses, the Caronia decision might distort the notion of truthful
off-label promotion to the extent that a product's off-label efficacy and
safety are underreported or undetermined, yet still considered truthful
and non-fraudulent.'3 5 Despite the disincentive for manufacturers to
provide adequate articles and research in this scenario, prescribers would
likely not rely solely on a representative's assertions, and would most
likely still want to review documentation of a product's off-label use
before prescribing the product for such use.
B. PhysiciansandPatients
The majority opinion in Caronia stresses the importance of the
relationship between doctors and patients, namely the role that
prescribers play as gatekeepers between patients and potentially helpful
treatments.136 Just as the government has an interest in protecting patients
from unsafe and ineffective drugs, physicians have an interest in
providing patients with treatment options that provide the best outcomes
with the least chance of adverse effects.137
Post-Caronia, prescribers and their patients would still be
protected from fraudulent or untrue statements about a product's offlabel use via the government's continued authority to punish fraudulent
speech, as the decision renders only truthful speech constitutionally
protected.13 8 Should the decision in Caroniaapply nationwide, however,
the interactions between representatives and prescribers would no longer
be strictly limited to on-label and FDA-approved indications for a
product. In this sense, Caronia potentially opens the flood gates for
representatives attempting to market their company's product's off-label
uses, and runs the risk of discouraging the flow of information related to
on-label and FDA-approved product usages. 3 9 Physicians generally have

135.
136.
137.
13 8.
139.

See, e.g., Scheineson & Cuevas, supra note 34, at 214-15.
United States v. Caronia, 703 F.3d 149, 166 (2d Cir. 2012).
See, e.g., Khan & Holloway, supra note 3, at 408.
Id.
See, e.g., Recent Cases, supra note 34, at 802.

612

FIRST AMENDMENT LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 12

very little time to discuss products with representatives.14 0 Thus,
depending on the representative and the products being marketed,
meetings between representatives and prescribers could potentially be
focused on off-label uses for products rather than on soliciting and
providing information related to FDA-approved uses. 14 By focusing on
the stated purpose-encouraging the flow of information to physicians
and patients-the decision could create a bottle-neck of information,
with representatives presented with an incentive only to discuss the more
lucrative product usages, whether on- or off-label.
The decision also might lead to discrepancy over what
constitutes "truthful" speech in the context of representative-prescriber
discussions. 14 Under the current regulatory scheme, representatives may
not discuss off-label use of a product directly with a physician under any
circumstances.143 "Truthful" off-label information must be requested
specifically by the physician and must be supplied in the form of peerreviewed studies appearing in publications that meet various criteria.' 44If
the Caronia holding is applied nationwide, physicians would presumably
no longer have to request materials from a manufacturer's marketing or
compliance departments. Rather, physicians could discuss truthful offlabel use directly with the representative, leaving open the possibility
that "truthful" information will broaden in these interactions. 145 In lieu of
a different regulatory approach by the FDA, it is unclear where the limit
of truthful off-label speech would lie.146 The FDA established the
requirement that off-label information come in the form of peer-reviewed
and edited publications to ensure that physicians receive information free
from the taint of bias or inaccuracy.147 If representatives can speak on
behalf of the manufacturer, representatives may paint an accurate picture
of an off-label study but fail to include sufficient information about

140. See generally Susan Chimonas, Troyen A. Brennan & David J. Rothman,
Physicians and Drug Representatives: Exploring the Dynamics of the Relationship,
22 J. GEN. INTERN. MED. 184 (2007).
141. See id
142. See Scheineson & Cuevas, supra note 34, at 215.
143. GUIDANCE FOR INDUSTRY, supra note 52.
144. Id.
145. See Scheineson & Cuevas, supra note 34, at 212-13.
146. See id.
147. GUIDANCE FOR INDUSTRY, supra note 52.
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contraindications, side-effects, or information for minimizing the risks
presented in the study.148
Further, the decision might allow representatives to discuss

findings disseminated from sources beyond the peer-reviewed scholarly
articles currently allowed.149 In such a scenario, physicians, or the
government in the case of a prosecution, may find it difficult to
determine whether a representative's claims are indeed truthful. In order
to be protected by the First Amendment, commercial speech must both
concern a lawful activity and not be misleading.5 o In one sense, all offlabel promotion is misleading because the statements have not passed the
FDA-approval process and are not listed on the label. I But even if
truthful off-label promotion is constitutionally protected, the problems
inherent in allowing representatives to discuss a limited amount of
truthful off-label uses are apparent. What information representatives
could discuss with prescribers, and the form of that information, would
remain unclear,152 and without either an alternative regulatory scheme or
a shift in the focus of off-label enforcement, the holding in Caronia
could threaten the flow of information that the majority so strongly
emphasized. 153
C. The Government
The implications discussed thus far depend greatly on the
government's response to a situation where Caronia is accepted
nationwide. If the holding in Caronia is adopted by the Supreme Court,
one thing is for certain: the FDA will still regulate off-label promotion by

148. See Scheineson & Cuevas, supra note 34, at 215.
149. But see Khan & Holloway, supra note 3, at 430-31 (suggesting a safe
harbor for speech related to off-label studies conducted via comparative effective
research).
150. Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Public Serv. Comm'n of N.Y., 447
U.S. 557, 563, 566 (1980) (defining misleading speech as "communication more
likely to deceive the public than inform it").
151. See Polubinski, supra note 134, at 1025.
152. It is hard to imagine, for instance, a representative citing a scholarly
article on a product's off-label use with the level of technical specificity and lack of
bias as would be present in the scholarly article.
153. United States v. Caronia, 703 F.3d 149, 167 (2d Cir. 2012).
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representatives.154 This regulation could be in the form of a new
regulatory scheme, a new definition of the FDCA provisions, or an
enhanced focus on certain types of off-label promotion, separately or
combined with other regulations.
Statements from the FDA following the decision have indicated
that Caroniawill not significantly affect the agency's enforcement of the
drug misbranding provisions of the FDCA, and point to the fact that
enforcement based on false or misleading statements will continue
unabated.155 Indeed, recent cases illustrate that prosecutions for
fraudulent off-label marketing have continued to be pursued under both
the FDCA and the FCA.156 For example, in March 2013, Par
Pharmaceuticals pled guilty to a criminal misdemeanor for misbranding
Megace ES in violation of the FDCA, agreeing to pay $45 million and
enter into a five-year Corporate Integrity Agreement.1 57 Par had
promoted Megace for use in elderly patients, an off-label use, despite
never having conducted clinical studies on elderly people, and had
allegedly made false and misleading claims about the efficacy of their
product compared to rivals. ss Similarly, in UnitedStates v. Harkonen,159
154. See, e.g., Khan & Holloway, supra note 3, at 414-16 (discussing FCA
enforcement of fraudulent off-label promotion).
155. Erica Teichert, FDA Official Says Off-Label Ruling Won't Limit
Enforcement, LAW 360 BLOG (Jan. 30, 2013, 2:58 PM), http://www.1aw360
.com/articles/411478/fda-official-says-off-label-ruling-won-t-limit-enforcement.
156. See, e.g., Press Release, Dep't of Justice, Par PharmaceuticalsPleads
Guilty and Agrees to Pay $45 Million to Resolve Civil and Criminal Allegations
2013),
available at
5,
Marketing (Mar.
to
Off-Label
Related
http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/2013/March/13-civ-270.html; Memorandum from the
United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, United States v. Harkonen,
Nos. 11-10209, 11-10242 (Mar. 4, 2013), availableat http://cdn.ca9.uscourts.
gov/datastore/memoranda/2013/03/04/11-10209.pdf.
157. See Press Release, supra note 156. A corporate integrity agreement for a
health care provider is negotiated with the Office of Inspector General (OIG) as part
of a settlement, and generally requires that the company institute or promote
compliance measures such as hiring a compliance officer or appointing a compliance
committee, developing written standards and policies, implementing training
programs, and providing annual reports to the OIG. See Corporate Integrity
Agreement, U.S. Dep't of Health & Hum. Servs.: Office of Inspector General,
https://oig.hhs.gov/compliance/corporate-integrity-agreements/index.asp (last visited
Mar. 19, 2014).
158. See Press Release, supra note 156.
159. See Memorandum, U.S. v. Harkonen, supra note 156.
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the Ninth Circuit upheld the conviction of the former CEO of InterMune,
Inc. for wire fraud based on a press release allegedly containing false and
misleading statements about the off-label use of a product.160 The court
found that the statement was not "a scientific view" but was fraudulent
and thus not protected by the First Amendment.
These cases illustrate that an emphasis on enforcement of
fraudulent and misleading off-label speech has begun to occur.162
Focusing on fraudulent and misleading off-label speech leaves less room
for future First Amendment challenges.163 Proving fraudulent speech also
heightens the government's evidentiary burden by requiring the
government to find and prove instances of fraudulent or false speech.
Indeed, the government might even stop forbidding the "promotion" of
off-label uses and start prohibiting altogether the introduction of drugs
that the company intends to be used off-label.
With these cases in
mind, commentators have suggested that manufacturers should not alter
their compliance efforts despite the victory in Caronia.
If the holding in Caronia were to be applied nationwide,
however, the FDA would have to overhaul its enforcement of off-label
promotion by manufacturers and their representatives.167 As discussed
above, the Caronia majority held that a representative's truthful speech
regarding off-label indications of a product is protected by the First
Amendment, necessitating heightened scrutiny, and that the FDA's
interpretation of the FDCA's provisions failed the third and fourth
prongs of the Central Hudson test. Those prongs of the analysis
160. Id.
161. Id.
162. See Two New Developments in FirstAmendment Challenges to Off-Label
Promotion: What's Next?, KING & SPALDING CLIENT ALERT, Mar. 13, 2013,
http://www.kslaw.com/imageserver/KSPublic/library/publication/ca031313.pdf.
163. Id.
164. See id.

165. See Yan, supra note 34, at 191 (citing Erika Kelton, Off-Label Pharma
Prosecutions Won't Be Silenced by First Amendment Decisions, FORBES (Jan 4,
2013, 1:10 PM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/erikakelton/2013/01/04/off-labelpharma-prosecutions-wont-be-silenced-by-first-amendment-decision/).
166. See Martin L. Seidel et al., Second Circuit's Caronia Decision Could
Significantly Change Life Science Companies' Exposure for Off-Label Promotion,
25 HEALTH LAW 39, no. 3, at 40-41 (Feb. 2013).
167. See Tyler et al., supra note 111, at 38.
168. See supra Part 111.
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specifically require that the law restricting protected speech both directly
advance the government's interest and be narrowly drawn to further the
interest served.169 Thus, any alternative regulatory enforcement scheme
would have to more directly advance the government's interest in
"preserving the efficacy and integrity of the FDA's drug approval
process and reducing patient exposure to unsafe and ineffective drugs,"
while not "interfer[ing] with the ability of physicians and patients to
receive potentially relevant treatment information."', 0
Any alternative regulatory scheme proposed by the government
would thus have to be more narrowly drawn than the current regime to
further their interests. 1 In looking at the Central Hudson test's fourth
prong, the court in Caronia makes several suggestions for government
enforcement of off-label marketing that it felt would be more narrowlytailored than the current system.172 These are obviously only suggestions
for a more narrowly-drawn regulatory system, and a number of the
suggestions in tandem might adequately advance the government's
interests while being better tailored to those interests. 173
1. Provide Guidance to Physicians
The first alternative the Caronia court suggests is aimed at the
government's interest in protecting physicians from off-label information
that might , be misleading. 17 4 The opinion simply states that the
government could "guide physicians and patients in differentiating
between misleading and false promotion, exaggerations and
embellishments, and truthful and non-misleading information."17 While
it seems unlikely that this option would (or could) be enacted as a sole
replacement for the current system, the suggestion taken on its own is
insufficient for a number of reasons.

169. United States v. Caronia, 703 F.3d 149, 166-68 (2012).
170. Id. at 166.
171.
172.
173.
174.
175.

See id. at 167-68.
Id.
See Tyler et al., supra note 111, at 38.
Caronia,703 F.3d at 168.
Id
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The Caroniamajority does not go into any further detail than the
language quoted above, and, as previously mentioned,
the
government's ability to prosecute fraudulent and untruthful off-label
marketing does not change under the Caronia holding. Thus, even if the
holding is accepted nationwide, it would still be unlawful under the
FDCA and FCA for a manufacturer or representative to fraudulently
market a product. 177 The court's first suggestion, however, seems to
presume either that the government would not continue to prosecute false
or fraudulent statements under the FDCA misbranding and mislabeling
provisions, or that enforcement would decrease to the extent that
incentives for manufacturers and representatives to fraudulently market
would increase. 78 In either case, the opinion suggests that without the
current program there would be enough fraudulent and false marketing
conducted, and enough confusion on the part of prescribers, to
necessitate government guidance in the first place.
It is also unclear what type of guidance the court is suggesting.
Off-label indications by their nature presume a lack of government
expertise and knowledge because they are outside FDA approval.179 On
the one hand, the government could circulate or make more readily
available the types of studies that manufacturers can provide to
physicians under the current system. 80 The government might also
provide a "safe harbor" for drug companies to more liberally promote
such studies to prescribers, and there is no question that increasing
circulation of such items would bolster the flow of truthful information
from manufacturer to prescriber.182
It is unclear, however, whether the court is advocating an active
step for the government that would require the spreading of truthful
information about off-label prescription use as well as the collection and
analysis of such information.183 Considering that off-label uses of a
176. See supra note 138 and accompanying text.
177. See, e.g., Khan & Holloway, supra note 3, at 412-16.
178. See Caronia,703 F.3d at 168.
179. See, e.g., Khan & Holloway, supra note 3, at 411-12.
180. See GUIDANCE FOR INDUSTRY, supra note 52.
181. See Khan & Holloway, supra note 3, at 438.
182. If the government were to enact such a proactive approach to off-label
information under the current system, it would bolster the government's interests in
safety and patient protection.
183. See Caronia,703 F.3d at 166-68.
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product are not the focus of the FDA during the approval process, an
active step would require the government to, at the very least,
disseminate peer-reviewed studies on the safe and effective off-label uses
of a given product. At most, the government might fund the studies or
conduct something akin to secondary approval for a drug product before
suggesting (via dissemination of the articles) that certain off-label uses
are safe and effective. 184
The Caronia court's suggestion also seems to ignore the
manufacturer and representative side of the equation. It seems to
presume that manufacturers and representatives will react to the Caronia
decision by increasing the volume and frequency of fraudulent off-label
statements to the point that physicians would need guidance to sift
through the product claims. If, on the other hand, manufacturers were
given government assistance in the creation and dissemination of
information regarding a product's off-label use, it is likely that such
assistance would be effective in encouraging open channels of
communication regarding effective off-label treatments.' 85
2. Provide Reminders as to Liability
Along the same lines, and perhaps suggested in concert with
government "guidance," the court next suggests that "the FDA could
further remind physicians and manufacturers of, and even perhaps further
regulate, the legal liability surrounding off-label promotion and treatment
decisions."' 86 This suggestion seems to encompass two very different
actions by the government. On one hand, whether manufacturers need to
be reminded of liability regarding off-label prescribing is questionable
considering the seemingly constant threat of enforcement for off-label
promotion.187 Reminding physicians of liability related to medical
184. See Khan & Holloway, supra note 3, at 430-31 ("[I]n the presence of
research criteria that can be validated as trustworthy, the FDA should allow for
wider and less restricted dissemination of off-label study findings.").
185. See, e.g., Khan & Holloway, supra note 3, at 426-28 (summarizing the
arguments in support of off-label promotion).
186. Caronia,703 F.3d at 168.
187. See, e.g., John Osbom, Feds Have Beaten Pharma Into Submission Over
Off-Label Drug Use, But at What Cost?, FORBES PHARMA & HEALTHCARE BLOG
(Nov. 7, 2013, 1:10 PM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/johnosborni/2013/11/07/ho("[I]f the FDA
hum-another-multi-billion-dollar-drug-company-fraud-settlement/
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malpractice or negligence theories of liability would not hurt the parties
involved. As with the manufacturers, however, a reminder of the threat
of actions for such liability would, in all likelihood, render a reminder
188
unnecessary.
On the other hand, the court suggests further regulating legal
liability related to off-label promotion and treatments.189 Enacting
regulations addressing the legal liability for manufacturer promotion or
prescriber prescriptions of off-label products are certainly alternatives to
the current system, but the Caroniacourt offers no further indication of
how these alternatives would address the government's interests better
than the current system. Placing incentives on either the manufacturer or
prescriber to ensure the safe prescribing of products for off-label use
would be beneficial to overall patient safety, but increasing liability on
either party for off-label treatment decisions, particularly if the decisions
are based on an effective or truthful off-label use, would interfere with a
prescriber's medical judgment. 190 Further, if manufacturers are held
liable for off-label treatment, they would essentially be responsible for
something that they have very little control over, and such regulation
would place an unfair burden on the manufacturer to monitor prescribing
practices in order to ensure that physicians are prescribing the
manufacturer's products correctly.
3. Develop Warning or Disclaimer Systems or Safety Tiers
While the Caronia court's suggestions that the government
provide further "guidance" and "regulation"1 91 are vague and would
potentially be either ineffective if enacted alone or difficult to
implement, the remaining suggestions are slightly more compelling.192
The opinion states that the government could "develop its warning or
has not approved the indication then you are promoting off-label and you are liable
regardless of the amount of medical, scientific and clinical data that supports your
position.").
188. Id.
189. See Osborn, supra note 48, at 306-07 (describing the "vigorous policy
debate over the significance and validity of truthful medical and scientific
information that is not included in the FDA-approved label").
190. Id. at 303-04.
191. Caronia,703 F.3d at 168.
192. Id.
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disclaimer systems, or develop safety tiers within the off-label market, to
distinguish between drugs."l 9 3 The court cites to an article in which the
author argues that manufacturers should be permitted to provide
information about off-label use to physicians as long as the information
provided is accompanied by an adequate disclaimer regarding the
scientific bases of the off-label use.194
Providing a disclaimer regarding the bases of peer-reviewed
studies of off-label uses would, in theory, further inform prescribers of
the potential risks of a product's off-label use, but runs the same risk of
untruthfulness that any other manufacturer communication runs, and the
disclaimers would have to be closely monitored. Furthermore, product
labels already contain information about potential side-effects and
contraindications, thus additional warning would add little marginal
value.195 The product at issue in Caronia, in fact, was required by the
FDA to be accompanied by a "black box" warning, which is "the most
serious warning placed on prescription medication labels," and warned
against safety and efficacy in certain patients.196 Additionally, the FDA
regulates the distribution of the drug at issue in Caroniaby allowing only
one centralized pharmacy to distribute the product nationwide,197
suggesting that the safety of the drug should be obvious to prescribers. If
the FDA wanted to completely prohibit the off-label prescribing of a
certain product, as the Caronia opinion later suggests,198 they likely
could.1 99
Providing safety tiers or further warning systems for off-label
use is slightly problematic, namely because information regarding a
product's off-label use, by nature of being "off-label," is not included on

193. Id (citing Coleen Klasmeier & Martin H. Redish, Off-Label Prescription
Advertising, the FDA and the First Amendment: A Study in the Values of
Commercial Speech and Protection, 37 AM. J. L. & MED. 315, 334 (2011)).
194. Coleen Klasmeier & Martin H. Redish, Off-Label Prescription
Advertising, the FDA and the First Amendment: A Study in the Values of
Commercial Speech andProtection, 37 AM. J. L. & MED. 315, 334 (2011).
195. See id.
196. Caronia,703 F.3d at 155.
197. Id.
198. Id. at 168 ("[W]here off-label drug use is exceptionally concerning, the
government could prohibit the off-label use altogether.").
199. Id. at 168.
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the product's labeling or in the product's packaging.200 One of the
dangers of off-label treatments is surely the risk of incorrect or
dangerous dosages in the absence of FDA-approved indications, but
providing further directions beyond the findings and indications of peerreviewed studies would require an additional step towards legitimizing
the practice of off-label prescribing.20 This additional step might further
incentivize manufacturers to avoid supplemental approval for a
product.202 It is also unclear what warning system the court is suggesting
beyond the current "black box" and distribution restrictions already
available to the FDA. 20 3
4. Require a List of All Intended Indications During the Initial Approval
Process
The Caronia decision goes on to state that "the government
could require pharmaceutical manufacturers to list all applicable or
intended indications when they first apply for FDA approval, enabling
physicians, the government, and patients to track a drug's
development."204 This suggestion assumes that a product will be
prescribed off-label for all intended indications a manufacturer is aware
of prior to FDA-approval, regardless of the indication's efficacy, and that
a manufacturer will be aware of all possible off-label indications when
205
submitting a product to the FDA for approval. It would thus open the
possibility that a manufacturer could list a wide range of "possible"
intended indications prior to the FDA approval process in the hopes that
the product, after being approved for limited uses, could be prescribed
for a variety of indications. When the FDA approves a product in this
scenario, there is a risk that information distinguishing safe from
effective off-label uses from ineffective uses would not be readily
available.

200. See Recent Cases, supra note 34, at 800-02.
201. Khan & Holloway, supra note 3, at 428.
202. Id.
203. See Caronia,703 F.3d at 155.
204. Id. at 168.
205. See, e.g., A. Elizabeth Blackwell & James M. Beck, Drug Manufacturers'
First Amendment Right to Advertise and Promote Their Productsfor Off-Label Use:
Avoiding a Pyrrhic Victory, 58 FOOD & DRUG L.J. 439, 457-58 (2003).
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It is also questionable how closely and to what extent physicians
or patients would actually track the progress of a product's approval,
particularly if the product in question will not be approved for the
particular course of treatment. To the extent that such tracking would
improve knowledge or awareness of a product's safe and effective use,
however, this tracking could benefit patients and further the
government's interests.
5. Create a Ceiling on Off-Label Prescriptions
Finally, and perhaps most persuasively, the Caronia opinion
suggests that the government create "ceilings or caps on off-label
prescriptions."206 While placing a limit on the overall total of off-label
prescriptions for drugs might negatively affect patients being treated with
207
off-label products, commentators have suggested that a quota system,
whereby a manufacturer is required to seek FDA-approval after off-label
prescriptions of a particular product reach a certain number or
percentage, would provide a speech-neutral alternative to the current
system.208 By tracking off-label prescriptions via something similar to the
Prescription Drug Monitoring Programs (PDMPs) that are currently
209
active in forty-one states, the FDA could require that manufacturers
submit a product for secondary approval once a certain threshold of
prescriptions is met.210 This would allow manufacturers to truthfully
market products for off-label use while ensuring FDA-approval of the
product once prescriptions of the product reach a threshold limit.211
Such a program would be difficult to enact, however, as there is
currently no uniformity among the state PDMP programs, and the
government would be required to pass legislation implementing such a
program on a national scale in order to track all prescriptions written
206. Caronia,703 F.3d at 168.
207. See Blackwell & Beck, supra note 205, at 460-61.
208. Iraggi, supra note 34, at 1160.
209. Id. (citing Thomas Clark et al., PRESCRIPTION DRUG MONITORING
PROGRAM CTR. OF EXCELLENCE, HELLER SCH. FOR SOCIAL POLICY & MANAGEMENT,

Prescription Drug Monitoring Programs: An Assessment of the Evidence of Best
Practices,BRANDEIS UNIv. 5 (Sept. 20, 2012), availableat http:/www
.pdmpexcellence.org/sites/all/pdfs/BrandeisPDMPReport.pdf).
210. See id. at 1161-62.
211. Id. at 1160-62.
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212

nationwide.
The implementation and standardization of a national
PDMP program would thus be costly and likely take great effort. 2 13
Additionally, all prescribers would have to standardize their prescription
pads or be compelled to write prescriptions via an electronic system so
214
This would
that their prescribing practices could be tracked.
undoubtedly frustrate members of the medical community, whose
discretion and medical judgment is a key interest at stake in such matters.
Manufacturers would likely also dislike being forced to seek
FDA-approval simply because a product is successful for off-label use.
Whereas under the current system manufacturers can seek secondary
approval if they desire to lawfully promote a product, under the proposed
quota system they would be compelled to file for such approval. 2 15 The
FDA could, potentially, make it easier for a successful off-label product
to obtain secondary approval, but the process would still likely be costly
and time-intensive. Drawbacks aside, limiting off-label prescriptions via
a quota system would have the best chance of preserving the integrity of
the FDA's drug-approval regime, would most adequately replace the
current enforcement regime for truthful off-label promotion and
prescribing, and would allow for the free-flow of information between
manufacturer and physician.216
IV. CONCLUSION

It is too early to tell what effect, if any, the Second Circuit's
Caronia decision will have on the government's regulation of off-label
marketing by drug and device manufacturers and their representatives.
Without knowing the government's reaction, the implications for the
other parties involved are unclear. The decision will likely have little
effect outside of the Second Circuit for now, but the current system,
whereby off-label promotion is illegal while off-label prescribing is
permitted, does not adequately address the interests of the parties
involved. In light of the Supreme Court's holding in Sorrell,217 there is
212.
213.
214.
215.
216.
217.

Id.
See id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
U.S.

, 131 S. Ct. 2653.
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hope that, should the Supreme Court hear a case similar to Caronia, it
might find along the same lines as the Caroniacourt. On the other hand,
there is also the possibility that the Supreme Court would find that the
government's current interpretation of the FDCA satisfies heightened
scrutiny and is the most narrowly-tailored option available. Until such an
opinion occurs, however, manufacturers are stuck complying with
regulations that criminalize the promotion of a legal activity.

